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CONCURRENCE OF REMEDIES FOR LABOR UNION
DISCRIMINATION
Employment discrimination by labor unions affects two groups
in the labor force-applicants for unionized employment and employ-
ees represented by union bargaining agents. Applicants for employ-
ment may be victims of discrimination when a union operates a hir-
ing hall that refuses to refer certain minority workers, or has a mem-
bership policy based on nepotism or majority approval. Discrimina-
tion against its own members may occur when a union refuses to
process grievances of certain categories of employees, or when a
union, bargaining for a labor contract with an employer, agrees to
unequal classifications of employees concerning seniority, wages or
conditions of employment. To combat these discriminations, three
separate federal assurances of equal employment apply to labor or-
ganizations: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the National
Labor Relations Act,2 and section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States
Code.3 This paper deals with the first two remedies and the problem
of their concurrent application.'
Coverage Under Title VII
Title VII protects from discriminatory acts by labor organiza-
tions both union members5 and applicants for membership.' Title VII
expressly prohibits union activity which excludes or expels an indi-
vidual from its membership,7 limits, segregates, classifies, or refuses
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended, (Supp. 11 1972).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
4. Section 1981 prohibits private racial discrimination in employment by compa-
nies and unions. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l. Harv. Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th
Cir. 1970). The equal employment provisions of Title VII do not supersede the provi-
sions of section 1981. Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
Section 1981 is not discussed in this comment since the discussion of section 1983 in
this Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540 (1974) is generally applicable to it. See Boudreaux
v. Baton Rouge Mar. Cont. Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. 2000e 2(c)(1) (Supp. II 1972). International Union, which had chart-
ered two segregated local unions, violated the Act by classifying its members as to race.
United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
6. Id. § 2000e 2(c)(2) (Supp. II 1972). The original text of the Act made no men-
tion of applicants being covered. However, subsequent case law included protection
for applicants. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Asbestos Workers
Local 53 v. Volger, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). Later the 1972 amendments specifi-
cally extended coverage to applicants.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(c) (1).
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to refer any member or applicant for membership in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive the individual of employment oppor-
tunities because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.'
All labor organizations9 engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce'0 are covered by Title VII. For purposes of the Act, a union is
a labor organization if it is a representation committee in which em-
ployees participate for the purpose of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours and the terms and
conditions of employment;" or if it is an employee representation
committee subordinate to a national or international labor organiza-
tion.12 A labor organization is deemed to be engaged in an industry
affecting commerce if it operates a hiring hall, 3 or has more than
fifteen members and is certified" as the representative of employees
under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. If not certi-
fied, a labor organization with fifteen or more members is covered if
it is recognized by an employer in interstate commerce as the em-
ployee representative.'5 A local organization with fifteen or more
members falls within the Act, although not recognized by the em-
ployer or certified, if it has some formal relationship with a national
or international labor organization covered by Title VII. 6
Rights and remedies against discriminating unions and employ-
ers are administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC).' 7 Under the Act, a complainant must file his Title
8. Id. § 2000e 2(c)(2).
9. Id. § 2000e (d).
10. Id. § 2000e (e), (h): "The term 'industry affecting commerce' means any
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder
or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or indus-
try 'affecting commerce' within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
11. Id. § 2000e (d) (1970).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 2000e (e)(1).
14. Id. § 2000e (e)(2)(B)(1). Certification is a process whereby the National Labor
Relations Board or the National Mediation Board designates a labor organization as
the exclusive bargaining agent for the workers in a particular craft. See NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (e)(2)(B)(2) (Supp. II 1972).
16. Id. § 2000e (e)(2)(B)(3), (4), (5). The EEOC has decided that a union is
covered under this section if it has only ten local members and it is controlled to a
significant extent by an international union. EEOC Decision No. 7-3-336U, June 18,
1969; 1 F.E.P. Cases 909 (1969). See also EEOC Decision No. 7157, July 17, 1970; 3
F.E.P. Cases 94 (1972).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)-(i) (1970).
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VII claim through the EEOC, 8 which is authorized to investigate
charges of discrimination 8 and attempt to resolve the dispute
through informal methods of conference, conciliation and persua-
sion.2 " The 1972 amendments to Title VII extended to the EEOC
power to sue on behalf of the complainant if conciliation breaks down
or provides a result unsatisfactory to the Commission."
Procedures for exercising rights under Title VII are complicated
and time consuming for the complainant. Claims must be filed
through the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation.2 But if a
state or local fair employment agency exists, has enforcement powers,
and can provide adequate civil remedies, the EEOC must defer to
that agency. If the state or local agency drops the claim, or fails to
provide the complainant with relief, he must file a charge with the
EEOC within 30 days.24 The EEOC must then notify respondent of
the charge within ten days. The EEOC then makes an investigation,
a determination to prosecute the charge, and a finding of reasonable
cause as promptly as possible and if practical within 120 days. If
these are found in favor of the complainant, conciliation efforts are
made by the EEOC. If conciliation fails after 30 days, the EEOC has
enforcement powers to sue in federal district court on behalf of the
complainant. If the EEOC makes findings against the complainant
and drops the matter, the individual may file a private suit in district
18. Claimants must go through EEOC procedures before filing a private suit.
Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
910 (1967); Mickel v. South Carolina State Emp. Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 111972).
20. Id. The policy of informal conciliation is one of the strongest in the Act. See
Dent v. St. Louis-San Fran. R.R. Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Sea-
board Air Line R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Observer
Trans. Co. v. Lee, 394 U.S. 918 (1968).
21. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (5)(f)(1) (Supp. 111972). Before the 1972 amendments grant-
ing enforcement powers to the EEOC, there was a procedure whereby the government
could sue on behalf of the complainant. The Attorney General of the United States
could bring a civil action whenever he had reasonable cause to believe that an employer
or union was engaged in a "pattern or practice" of resistance to equal employment
rights. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a) (1970). The new amendment provided that on March 24,
1972, the duties of the Attorney General regarding "pattern or practice" cases were to
be transferred to the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(c), (d), (e) (Supp. 111972).
22. Id. § 2000e-5e (1970).
23. Grosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971). The state
or local fair employment agency must provide a meaningful and suitable remedy to
the complainant.
24. Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydro., 456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972). A single
filing is allowed where EEOC receives the claim and forwards it without delay to a
state agency. The EEOC is not considered to have usurped state or local agency
jurisdictions.
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court within 30 days after he receives a right to sue notice. EEOC's
deadline for filing a suit after unsuccessful conciliation efforts is 180
days; if EEOC fails to timely commence suit, the individual may do
so but only within ninety days.2"
The courts have attempted to relax some procedural standards
in favor of the complainant. A complainant may sue after filing a
claim if EEOC unduly delays in processing the claim, 6 or even if
EEOC makes its initial findings against the complainant. 7 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an EEOC failure to timely
notify the respondent of the charge cannot be prejudicial to the plain-
tiff" and further that EEOC's failure to commence conciliation pro-
ceedings could not bar plaintiff's institution of a civil suit against his
collective bargaiining agent.
Protections Under the National Labor Relations Act
Unions which act as exclusive bargaining agents are required to
represent employees fairly and without invidious discrimination.
This duty of fair representation was enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 3°
where a labor union was acting as the exclusive representative of all
employees, but bargained with the employer to systematically ex-
clude blacks from promotion and eventually from employment in the
company. The Supreme Court reasoned that since the union was
acting under authority of the Railway Labor Act as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the craft regardless of
their union or non-union status, it could not treat employees un-
equally. The duty of fair representation was also extended to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),:1 which prohibits unfair labor
practices :2 through the activities of the National Labor Relations
25. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) (Supp. 11 1972).
26. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967). Plaintiffs'
right to bring suit cannot be prejudiced because EEOC caseload and lack of trained
employees makes it unable to timely meet procedural requirements.
27. Feteke v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Beverly v. Lone Star
Lead Const. Co., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971). The EEOC's finding of no reasonable
cause to believe discrimination has occurred cannot bar the institution of a private
suit.
28. Cromecraft v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. Dent v. St. Louis-San Fran. R.R., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
31. Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). An unfair labor practice is the term used to denote
any activity by the employer or union specifically prohibited by the NLRA.
1974]
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Board (NLRB).""
In 1953 the NLRB also decided that a union's breach of the duty
of fair representation violated the NLRA.34 Later, in Miranda Fuel
Co.,35 the Board held that a union's interference with an employee's
right to be free from seniority discrimination in matters affecting his
employment constituted an unfair labor practice. In addition, an
employer who participates in the arbitrary union conduct violates the
Act and commits an unfair labor practice also.36 The NLRB has ex-
tended fair representation protection to applicants for membership37
and for referral through a union hiring hall.3" Union members alleging
sex discrimination have recently received coverage under the duty of
fair representation.
39
Under the "pre-emption doctrine,"40 the NLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice cases. Thus, classification
of a breach of the duty of fair representation as an unfair labor prac-
33. Id. § 153 (1970).
34. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953). In Hughes Tool Co., the Board
found that a breach of the duty of fair representation violated the NLRA and ordered
the immediate revocation of the certification of the local unless the practice of discrim-
inatory application of grievance procedures ceased.
35. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). The doctrine that a breach of the
duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice has been affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit. Local Union 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
36. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). The Court of Appeals in the
District of Columbia has recently held that an employer acting alone could commit
an unfair labor practice by treating employees unequally. The court found that the
employer who sponsored separate and unequal fringe benefits for Anglo, Mexican-
American and black workers violated the employees' rights to be free from coercion in
their concerted union activities. United Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The NLRB criticized this decision in Jubilee
Manufacturing Co., 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973), stating that every employer's act of
discrimination was not a per se violation of the NLRA. But the Board was careful to
point out that where employer discrimination directly affects the primary function of
the NLRA to foster collective bargaining agreements, protect employee rights to act
concertedly and conduct union elections, a violation of the NLRA may be found.
37. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
38. Houston Maritime Assn., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967).
39. Petersen v. Ruth Pack. Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972). In Petersen, the court
found that the union breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent
two women in their complaint seeking reclassification of certain male job categories.
Both the union and the employer breached a requirement in their collective bargaining
agreement by refusing to consider the individual qualifications of an employee request-
ing a transfer to a job in a different classification.
40. San Diego Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). When an
activity is subject to or arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA, the
state as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB.
19741 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
tice raised the question as to whether the courts, who had initially
created the doctrine, retained jurisdiction over fair representation
cases. In Vaca v. Sipes,4 the Supreme Court made it clear that the
courts could hear fair representation suits concurrently with the
NLRB. The courts have the power to grant equitable relief, award
damages and back pay, and to compel arbitration.4"
Although members alleging unfair representation are free to seek
remedies through the courts or through the NLRB, both routes re-
quire, as a prerequisite to complaint or suit, the exhaustion of inter-
nal union grievance procedures.4 But the duty of the union to process
an employee's grievance is not absolute. Both the courts and the
NLRB allow the union a range of discretion in refusing to process
complaints which it feels are unreasonable or lack merit.4 Once the
complainant has exhausted his internal union remedies, the NLRB
and the courts generally defer to the arbitrator's decision. In
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.4" the Board stated it would defer to an
arbitrator's award if the proceedings were fair and regular, the parties
had agreed to be bound by the decision, and the decision was not
repugnant to the policies of the NLRA. Subsequently, the Board
extended the deferral doctrine so that it would overturn an arbitra-
tor's award only if it were shown that the arbitration proceedings were
tainted with fraud, collusion, or procedural irregularities.46 Similarly,
41. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). In Sipes, the union refused to arbitrate through the final
step an employee's complaint that he had been wrongfully discharged. The Missouri
supreme court held that the union had violated the duty of fair representation. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the union had acted reasonably
in deciding not to proceed in the arbitration because of the weight of evidence against
the complainant. The Court added, however, that courts still retained jurisdiction over
fair representation cases in spite of the pre-emption doctrine. The Court reasoned that
Congress had not intended this judicially created right to come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. Also, the instant case was a section 301 suit which is under
the court's jurisdiction, but the Court did not limit its ability to hear fair representa-
tion cases to section 301 situations.
42. The Board has the power to order persons to cease and desist unfair labor
practices and to order reinstatement of employees with or without backpay. 29 U.S.C.
160 (c) (1970).
43. Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968); Stringfield v. Rubber
Workers, Local 101, 285 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1960); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336
F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971); General Teamsters, Local 890, 193 N.L.R.B. 1048
(1971). An exception to this general rule may occur if the suit is against a union which
the court feels is hostile to the complainant. See also Brady v. Trans World Air., Inc.,
401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
44. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953); Chrysler Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 898 (1971); General Box, 189 N.L.R.B. 269 (1971).
45. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
46. International Harv. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
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the courts have a policy of deferral to the arbitration proceedings and
its award.47
Although it is the later legislative mandate, the enactment of
Title VII did not preempt existing remedies under the NLRA18 Thus
union members are furnished alternative means to remedy discrimi-
nation by their labor representatives; under the duty of fair represen-
tation through the courts and the NLRB, and under Title VII through
the EEOC. In pursuing fair representation remedies both the courts
and the NLRB require that an employee complaint be first processed
through internal union procedures. 9 However, an employee need not
pursue his contractual grievance remedy as a prerequisite to bringing
a suit under Title VII. 5 The problem of whether to defer to an arbitra-
tor's decision once the employee has voluntarily submitted his claim
to his union's grievance-arbitration machinery has been a source of
conflict among the circuits . 5 The Supreme Court recently resolved
this conflict in Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co. 2 The Court held
that an employee's prior submission of a grievance under a nondiscri-
mination clause in the union contract does not affect his statutory
right to a trial de novo under Title VII. The Court reasoned that
Congress gave federal courts the ultimate power to secure compliance
with Title VII and therefore a prior arbitration decision could not
47. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In the Steelworkers
trilogy the court stated that the arbitrator's decision must be enforced by the courts
even if the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is different from the courts' or is
ambiguous.
48. United Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Rubber Workers, Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
49. See note 40 supra.
50. Caldwell v. National Brew. Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp.
943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
51. The Tenth Circuit position was that an adverse arbitration award is binding
on the employee as well as the employer, and the employee is estopped from subjecting
the employer to a second action under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner Denver, 466
F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit rule was that an employee could
proceed concurrently with both arbitration and Title VII claims, but he must ulti-
mately make an election as to one remedy so as to preclude duplicate relief. Bowe v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). The position in the Fifth Circuit
was that courts should defer to an arbitrator's decision only if the employee's contrac-
tual rights in the collective bargaining agreement are identical to Title VII protections,
the arbitrator's decision covered the issues presented in the Title VII claim, and those
issues were actually decided with adequate evidence in an impartial proceeding free
of procedural infirmities. Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. 42 U.S.L.W. 4214 (Feb. 19, 1974).
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divest the federal courts of jurisdiction. Regarding the national policy
favoring deferral to arbitration decisions in labor disputes, the Court
found that a Title VII action was not to be considered a review of the
arbitrator's decision, but rather a statutory right independent of the
arbitration process. The Court also pointed to the differences between
a Title VII action and an arbitration proceeding as further evidence
that Congress intended Title VII as an independent remedy. Congress
designates the federal courts as the ultimate authority in determining
an employee's Title VII rights; an arbitrator's scope of review in
determining an employee's rights is limited to interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement. Thus the court found that an em-
ployee may elect to pursue his Title VII remedy even after submitting
his claim to arbitration.
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